Self-stabilization is a versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed systems that permits to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors. This paper focuses on systems that are both self-stabilizing and Byzantine tolerant. Combining these two properties is known to induce many impossibility results. Hence, there exist several fault tolerance schemes to contain Byzantine faults in self-stabilization. In this paper, we consider the well known problem of constructing a maximum metric tree in this context. We provide a new distributed protocol that ensures the best possible containment with respect to topology-aware strict and strong stabilization.
Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [12, 13, 35 ] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any number and any kind of transient faults, while Byzantine Faulttolerance [31] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is appealing yet proved difficult [9, 14, 33] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
A promising path towards multitolerance to both transient and Byzantine faults is Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was proposed [32, 33] . Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside which the effect of permanent Byzantine faults is masked, provided that the problem specification makes it possible to break the causality chain that is caused by the faults. As many problems are not local, it turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those.
This paper proposes to study a new Byzantine fault containment scheme in selfstabilization in order to circumvent those impossibility results. The weaker notion of strong stabilization was proposed [20] : here, correct vertices outside the containment radius may be perturbated by the actions of Byzantine vertices, but only a finite number of times. Recently, the idea of generalizing strict and strong stabilization to an area that depends on the graph topology and the problem to be solved rather than an arbitrary fixed containment radius was proposed [18] and denoted by topology aware strict (and strong) stabilization.
Contributions In this paper, we illustrate the effectiveness of these Byzantine containment schemes by studying a global problem: the maximum metric spanning tree construction. The goal is to construct a particular spanning tree that maximizes the metric of all vertices in the system with respect to a given metric. Indeed, even if any spanning tree minimizes by definition the number of communication links, all are not equivalent. We can consider some criteria to distinguish spanning trees. For example, a breadth-first search (BFS) spanning tree [1, 16, 28] allows us to minimize the delay of communication between any vertex and a distinguished one (called the root of the tree) and a minimum weight spanning tree [23] minimizes the global weight of the tree (in the case of weighted communication graph).
In this paper, we focus on a large class of spanning tree constructions: the maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to any maximizable metric [27] . Intuitively, a metric is a scheme to compute a distance between two vertices along any path of the communication graph. A metric is maximizable if there always exists a spanning tree that maximizes the metric of each vertex of any communication graph with respect to a distinguished vertex called the root. For example, the shortest path [36] or the flow metric [25] are maximizable. In contrast, there exists no maximizable metric to model the minimum weight [23] or the minimum degree [2, 4] spanning tree construction. The large span of this class of metrics motivates some previous works [26, 27] .
Contributions of this paper are twofold. First, motivated by impossibility results of strict stabilization for global tasks [33] (as the spanning tree construction), we define three concepts for Byzantine containment in self-stabilization. These new concepts, respectively called strong stabilization, topology-aware strict stabilization, and topology-aware strong stabilization, weaken the constraints on the containment radius of strict stabilization in order to by-pass such impossibility results. In strong stabilization, the containment radius is weakened in time since we allow correct vertices outside the containment radius to be disturbed a finite number of times by Byzantine ones after the convergence to a legitimate configuration. In topology-aware stabilization, the weakening is in space since we generalize the containment radius to a containment area. This containment area is simply the set of correct vertices (that is a function of the communication graph) that may be infinitely often disturbed by Byzantine vertices. Note that this weakening in the containment radius into containment area may be applied both to strict and strong stabilization. Then, we prove the effectiveness of our new concepts of Byzantine containment in self-stabilization using maximum metric spanning tree construction as a benchmark. We design a distributed protocol that achieves the optimal containment areas for topology-aware strict and strong stabilization for maximum metric spanning construction for any maximizable metric.
Related Works Spanning tree construction was extensively studied in the context of distributed systems either in a fault-free setting or in presence of faults. In faultfree distributed systems, there exist a number of adaptations of centralized protocols to construct spanning trees with respect to numerous properties (e.g. minimum weight spanning trees [23] , minimum degree spanning trees [2] , or Steiner trees [7] ).
Gärtner presents in [24] a good survey on self-stabilizing distributed protocols for spanning tree construction for the three simplest properties: depth-first search spanning trees, breadth-first spanning trees and shortest path spanning trees. The first selfstabilizing distributed protocol to construct a depth-first search spanning tree was by Collin and Dolev [8] . Note that any self-stabilizing token circulation (see e.g. [10, 29] ) may be used to construct such a spanning tree. Regarding breadth-first search spanning tree construction, the first self-stabilizing solution was by Dolev, Israeli and Moran [15, 16] but a simpler one was provided by [28] . Finally, self-stabilizing solutions to shortest path spanning tree construction may be found in [5, 30] for example. Note that there also exist self-stabilizing distributed protocols for more complex properties of spanning trees as the minimum diameter spanning trees [6] , minimum degree spanning trees [4] , or Steiner spanning trees [3] .
Gouda and Schneider [27] defined a large class of spanning tree constructions using the concept of maximizable metric. In this work, the metric of a path of the communication graph is the result of the application of the metric operator to the value of each edge of the path. For example, the shortest path metric associates a weight (a natural number) to each edge of the communication graph and the metric of a path is computed by the sum of the weight of each edge of the path. A metric is maximizable if there always exists a spanning tree that maximizes the metric of each vertex of any communication graph with respect to a distinguished vertex called the root. This concept of maximizable metric enclosed a lot of classical metrics such as breadth-first search, shortest path or flow metrics (defined in [34] ), that justifies the interest in maximum metric spanning tree construction. The main result of [27] is a full characterization of maximizable metrics. A self-stabilizing distributed protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to any maximizable metric is provided by [26] .
The idea to provide a generic distributed protocol able to compute a spanning tree according to a large class of metric motivates other works. For instance, another formalism that encompasses a different set of metrics is presented in [11, 21, 22] .
To our knowledge, there exists no distributed protocol for spanning tree construction in presence of both transient and Byzantine faults except our previous work on simple properties as depth-first search spanning tree [20] or breadth-first search spanning tree [18] . This paper proposes to generalize these results by studying the maximum metric spanning tree construction in distributed systems simultaneously subject to transient and Byzantine faults.
Organization of the Paper Section 2 presents formally the model of computation used in this paper. Then, we state formal definitions of our Byzantine containment schemes in Sect. 3 while Sect. 4 is devoted to the specification of the maximum metric spanning tree construction. We present and prove our topology-aware stabilizing distributed protocol in Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6 proves the optimality of containment areas presented in the previous section. Section 7 concludes the paper.
State Model
A distributed system g = (V, L) consists of a set V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } of vertices (a.k.a. processes) and a set L of bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct vertices. Vertices u and v are called neighbors if (u, v) ∈ L. The set of neighbors of a vertex v is denoted by N v . We do not assume existence of a unique identifier for each vertex. Instead we assume each vertex can distinguish its neighbors from each other by locally labeling them.
A distributed system g can be regarded as a (communication) graph whose vertex set is V and whose link set is L, so we use graph terminology to describe a distributed system g. We use the following notations: n = |V |, m = |L|, dist (g, u, v) denotes the distance between two vertices u and v in g (i.e. the length of the shortest path of g between u and v), and deg(g) denotes the maximal degree of g (i.e. the maximal number of neighbors of a vertex in g) while diam(g) denotes the diameter of g (i.e. the largest distance between two vertices of g).
In this paper, we consider distributed systems of arbitrary topology. We assume that a single vertex is distinguished as a root (denoted by r ), and all the other vertices are identical. We adopt the shared state model as a communication model in this paper, where each vertex can directly read the states of its neighbors.
The variables that are maintained by a vertex denote a vertex state. A vertex may take actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an atomic manner by the vertex. The actions executed by each vertex are described by a finite set of guarded actions of the form guard −→ statement . Each guard of vertex u is a boolean expression involving the variables of u and its neighbors.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product of states of all vertices. We define Γ to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed system g. For a vertex set R ⊆ V and two configurations γ and γ , we denote γ R → γ when γ changes to γ by executing an action of each vertex in R simultaneously. Notice that γ and γ can be different only in the states of vertices in R. For completeness of execution semantics, we should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring vertices. The action of a vertex depends only on its state at γ and the states of its neighbors at γ , and the result of the action reflects on the state of the vertex at γ .
We say that a vertex is enabled in a configuration γ if the guard of at least one of its actions is evaluated as true in γ .
A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of vertex sets. An infinite sequence of pairs of configurations σ = (γ 0 , γ 1 
. Vertex actions are executed atomically, and we distinguish some properties on the scheduler (or daemon). A distributed daemon schedules the actions of vertices such that any subset of vertices can simultaneously execute their actions. We say that the daemon is central if it schedules an action of only one vertex at any step. The set of all possible executions from γ 0 ∈ Γ is denoted by Σ γ 0 . The set of all possible executions is denoted by Σ, that is, Σ = γ ∈Γ Σ γ . We consider asynchronous distributed systems but we may add some of the following assumptions on schedules: any schedule is weakly fair (that is, it is impossible for any vertex to be infinitely and continuously enabled without executing its action in an execution), any schedule is strongly fair (that is, it is impossible for any vertex to be infinitely often enabled without executing its action in an execution), or/and k-bounded (that is, it is impossible for any vertex to execute more than k actions between two consecutive action executions of any other vertex).
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine vertex (i.e. a Byzantine-faulty vertex) can exhibit arbitrary behavior independently from its actions.
If v is a Byzantine vertex, v can repeatedly change its variables arbitrarily. For a given execution, the number of faulty vertices is arbitrary but we assume that the root vertex is never faulty. Indeed, without this assumption, any spanning tree construction problem is clearly impossible to solve since a Byzantine root may act as a non-root vertex leading correct vertices to construct a spanning tree in a distributed system without any distinguished vertex.
Containing Byzantine Faults in Stabilization
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem, while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification predicate (for short, specification), spec(v), for each vertex v: a configuration is a desired one (with a solution) if every vertex satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on variables of P v (⊆ V ) where P v is the set of vertices whose variables appear in spec(v). The variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (for short, O-variables). In what follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification spec(v).
A self-stabilizing protocol [12] is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration, where spec(v) holds at every vertex v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a legitimate configuration, each vertex never changes its O-variables and always satisfies spec (v) . From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every vertex correctly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently faulty vertices.
Strict Stabilization
When (permanent) Byzantine vertices exist, Byzantine vertices may not satisfy spec(v). In addition, correct vertices near the Byzantine vertices can be influenced and may be unable to satisfy spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [33] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a self-stabilizing protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine vertices.
Following definitions are with respect to a specification predicate spec. Given an integer c, a c-correct vertex is a vertex defined as follows.
An important limitation of the model of [33] is the notion of r -restrictive specifications. Intuitively, a specification is r -restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two vertices u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine tolerance is that the containment radius of strictly-stabilizing protocols solving those specifications is at least r . For some (global) problems (like spanning tree construction), r cannot be bounded by a constant. As a consequence, we can show that there exists no (c, 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for such a problem for any (finite) integer c.
Strong Stabilization
To circumvent such impossibility results of strict stabilization, we previously defined a weaker notion [20] . Here, the containment radius requirement is relaxed, i.e. there may exist vertices outside the containment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to Byzantine actions. However, the impact of Byzantine triggered actions is limited in time: the set of Byzantine vertices may only impact vertices outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine vertices execute an infinite number of actions.
In the following of this section, we present the formal definition of strong stabilization for a specification predicate spec. From the states of c-correct vertices (see Definition 1), c-legitimate configurations and c-stable configurations are defined as follows. Roughly speaking, the aim of self-stabilization is to guarantee that a distributed protocol eventually reaches a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. However, a selfstabilizing system can be disturbed by Byzantine vertices after reaching a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. The c-disruption represents the period where c-correct vertices are disturbed by Byzantine vertices and is defined as follows.
is a c-disruption if and only if the following holds:
1. δ is finite; 2. δ contains at least one action of a c-correct vertex that changes the value of an O-variable; 3. γ 0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable; and 4. γ t is the first configuration after γ 0 such that γ t is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable. Now we can define a self-stabilizing distributed protocol such that Byzantine vertices may only impact vertices outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine vertices execute an infinite number of actions. Note that a (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration is a (c, f )-contained configuration when t = k = 0, and thus, a (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration is a generalization (relaxation) of a (c, f )-contained configuration. Thus, a strongly stabilizing distributed protocol is weaker than a strictly stabilizing one (as vertices outside the containment radius may take incorrect actions due to Byzantine influence). However, a strongly stabilizing distributed protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing one (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine vertices).
The parameters t, k and c are introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each vertex to know the values of the parameters.
Topology-Aware Stabilization
We defined another weaker notion than the strict stabilization: the topology-aware strict stabilization [18] (denoted by TA strict stabilization for short). Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. the set of vertices that may be disturbed by Byzantine ones is not reduced to the union of c-neighborhood of Byzantine vertices (i.e. the set of vertices at distance at most c from a Byzantine vertex) but can be defined depending on the communication graph and Byzantine vertices location.
In the following, we give a formal definition of this new kind of Byzantine containment. From now, B denotes the set of Byzantine vertices and C B (which is a function of B) denotes a subset of V (intuitively, this set gathers all vertices that may be disturbed by Byzantine vertices).
Definition 9 (C B -correct vertex)
A vertex is C B -correct if it is a correct vertex (i.e. not Byzantine) that does not belong to C B .
Definition 10 (C B -legitimate configuration) A configuration γ is C B -legitimate for spec if every C B -correct vertex v is legitimate for spec (i.e. if spec(v) holds).
topology-aware contained for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine vertices, in any execution σ = (γ 0 , γ 1 ) . . ., every configuration is C B -legitimate and every C Bcorrect vertex never changes its O-variables.
The parameter C B of Definition 11 refers to the containment area. Any vertex that belongs to this set may be infinitely often disturbed by Byzantine vertices. The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine vertices.
Definition 12 (Topology-aware strict stabilization) A distributed protocol is (C B , f )topology-aware strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine vertices, any execution contains a configuration that is (C B , f )-topology-aware contained for spec.
Note that, if B denotes the set of Byzantine vertices and C
tributed protocol is a (c, f )-strictly stabilizing distributed protocol since C B is then equals to the union of the c-neighborhood of Byzantine vertices. Then, the concept of the topology-aware strict stabilization is a generalization of the strict stabilization. However, note that a TA strictly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing protocol (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine vertices). The parameter C B is introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each vertex to know the actual definition of the function.
Similarly to topology-aware strict stabilization, we can weaken the notion of strong stabilization using the notion of containment area. We present in the following the formal definition of this concept.
vertex never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine vertices make no action.
Definition 14 (C B -TA disruption) A portion of execution δ = (γ 0 , γ 1 ) . . . (γ t−1 , γ t ) (t > 1) is a C B -TA-disruption if
and only if the followings hold:
1. δ is finite; 2. δ contains at least one action of a C B -correct vertex that changes the value of a O-variable; 3. γ 0 is C B -legitimate for spec and C B -stable; and 4. γ t is the first configuration after γ 0 such that γ t is C B -legitimate for spec and C B -stable.
given at most f Byzantine vertices, the following properties are satisfied:
1. γ 0 is C B -legitimate for spec and C B -stable;
2. every execution starting from γ 0 contains a C B -legitimate configuration for spec after which the values of all the O-variables of C B -correct vertices remain unchanged (even when Byzantine vertices make actions repeatedly and forever); 3. every execution starting from γ 0 contains at most t C B -TA-disruptions; and 4. every execution starting from γ 0 contains at most k actions of changing the values of O-variables for each C B -correct vertex.
Definition 16 (Topology-aware strong stabilization) A distributed protocol π is (t, C B , f )-TA strongly stabilizing for spec if and only if there exists k ∈ N such that every execution starting from an arbitrary configuration and involving at most f Byzantine vertices contains a (t, k, C B , f )-TA time contained configuration for spec that is reached after at most rounds.Parameters and k are respectively the (t, C B , f )-stabilization and the (t, C B , f )-vertex disruption times of π .
Maximum Metric Tree Construction
In this section, we formally define maximum (routing) metric trees using formalism introduced by [27] . Informally, the goal of a distributed routing distributed protocol is to construct a tree that simultaneously maximizes the metric values of all of the vertices with respect to some total ordering ≺. Then, we can specify the problem considered in this paper.
Maximum metric tree First, we recall definitions and notations of [27] and state the main result about characterization of maximizable metrics (that is, metrics such that there always exists a tree maximizing the metric of each vertex).
Definition 17 (Routing metric) A routing metric (or just metric) M is a five-tuple M = (M, W, met, mr, ≺) where:
1. M is a set of metric values, 2. W is a set of edge weights, 3. met is a metric function whose domain is M × W and whose range is M, 4. mr is the maximum metric value in M with respect to ≺ and is assigned to the root of the system, 5. ≺ is a less-than total order relation over M that satisfies the following three conditions for arbitrary metric values m, m , and m in M: Moreover, any metric value m ∈ M \ {mr} satisfies the utility condition (that is, there exist w 0 , . . . , w k−1 in W and m 0 = mr, m 1 , . . . ,
For instance, we provide below the definition of three classical metrics with this model:
-the shortest path metric (SP), where the distance from any vertex to the root is minimized. Edge weights are natural numbers and the metric operator is the sum. -the flow metric (F), where each vertex chooses the path of maximal flow (i.e. the weight of the edge of minimum weight of the path) to the root. Edge weights are natural numbers and the metric operator is the minimum function. -the reliability metric (R), where each vertex chooses the path of maximal reliability (i.e. the product of edge weights of the path) to the root. Edge weights are real numbers (between 0 and 1) and the metric operator is the product.
Note also that we can model the construction of a spanning tree with no particular constraints in this model using the metric N C described below and the construction of a BFS spanning tree using the shortest path metric (SP) with W 1 = {1} (we denote this metric by BFS in the following).
Definition 18 (Assigned metric) An assigned metric over a communication graph g is a six-tuple (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf) where (M, W, met, mr, ≺) is a metric and wf is a function that assigns to each edge of g a weight in W .
Let a rooted path (from v) be an elementary path from a vertex v to the root r . The next set of definitions are with respect to an assigned metric (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf) over a given communication graph g.
Definition 19 (Metric of a rooted path)
The metric of a rooted path in g is the prefix sum of met over the edge weights in the path and mr.
Definition 20 (Maximum metric path) A rooted path p from v in g is called a maximum metric path with respect to an assigned metric if and only if for every other rooted path q from v in g, the metric of p is greater than or equal to the metric of q with respect to the total order ≺.
Definition 21 (Maximum metric of a vertex)
The maximum metric of a vertex v = r (or simply metric value of v) in g is defined by the metric of a maximum metric path from v. The maximum metric of r is mr. Definition 22 (Maximum metric spanning tree) A spanning tree t of g is a maximum metric spanning tree with respect to an assigned metric over g if and only if every rooted path in t is a maximum metric path in g with respect to the assigned metric.
The goal of the work of [27] is the study of metrics that always allow the construction of a maximum metric spanning tree. The definition follows.
Definition 23 (Maximizable metric)
A metric is maximizable if and only if for any assignment of this metric over any communication graph g, there is a maximum metric spanning tree for g with respect to the assigned metric.
An interesting result about maximizable metrics due to [27] provides a full characterization of maximizable metrics as follows. First, they define two classes of metrics. A metric is bounded if and only if the application of the metric function to any metric value does not increase it (for any edge weight) whereas a metric is monotonic if and only if the metric function preserves the order ≺ on metric values. Formal definitions follow. 
Then, [27] proves that a metric is maximizable if and only if it belongs to the intersection of these two classes of metrics.
Theorem 1 (Characterization of maximizable metrics [27]) A metric is maximizable if and only if this metric is bounded and monotonic.
Specification Given a maximizable metric M = (M, W, mr, met, ≺), the aim of this paper is to study the construction of a maximum metric spanning tree with respect to M rooted to a pre-defined vertex r (called the root) in simultaneous presence of transient and Byzantine faults. Note that we must assume that the root vertex is never a Byzantine one. It is obvious that these Byzantine vertices may disturb some correct vertices. Therefore, we relax the problem in the following way: we want to construct a maximum metric spanning forest with respect to M. The root of any tree of this spanning forest must be either the real root or a Byzantine vertex.
Each vertex v has three O-variables: a pointer to its parent in its tree (prnt v ∈ N v ∪ {⊥}), a variable that stores its current metric value (level v ∈ M) and an integer that stores a distance (dist v ∈ N). We use the following specification of the problem.
We introduce new notations as follows. Given an assigned metric (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf) over the communication graph g and two vertices u and v, we denote by max_met(g, u, v) the maximum metric of vertex u when v plays the role of the root of the communication graph (that is, when level v = mr). If u and v are neighbors, we denote by w u,v the weight of the edge {u, v} (that is, the value of wf({u, v})).
We define the legal distance of a vertex v with respect to one of its neighbors u (denoted legal_dist(v, u)) in the following way:
We can now specify the problem of the maximum metric spanning tree construction.
Specification 1 (spec MMT )
The specification predicate spec MMT (v) of the maximum metric tree construction with respect to a maximizable metric M for vertex v follows:
In other words, this specification states that every correct vertex belongs to a maximum metric spanning tree rooted either on the real root of the distributed system or to a Byzantine vertex that exhibits exactly the same state as the correct root.
At first glance, it may be surprising to define our problem in this way since correct vertices cannot know if they belong to a legitimate tree (that is, rooted at the real root of the distributed system) or a "fake" one (that is, rooted at a Byzantine vertex). The motivation behind this specification is the following. Recall that it is impossible for a correct vertex to detect whether one of its neighbors is Byzantine or not. Then, by symmetry, it is impossible to guarantee that correct neighbors of a Byzantine vertex (that acts as the correct root) does not begin to construct a spanning tree rooted at this Byzantine vertex if we want that correct neighbors of the correct root eventually join a spanning tree rooted at it. By repeating this argument, we can conclude that we have to accept the relaxation of the specification to a spanning forest construction since it is impossible to provide stronger guarantees for vertices that belong to a "fake" spanning tree.
Set of used metric values
We introduce here a new definition that is used in the following of this paper. Given an assigned metric over a communication graph, a used metric value is a metric value that is the metric of a rooted path of the communication graph (either rooted at the root or at a Byzantine vertex). More formally, Definition 27 (Set of used metric values) Given an assigned metric AM = (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf) over a communication graph g, the set of used metric values of AM is defined as:
Note that for any communication graph g and any assigned metric AM = (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf) over g, we have: M(g) ⊆ M.
Topology-Aware Stabilizing Solution
This section aims to present a distributed protocol for the maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to any maximizable metric in systems simultaneously subject to transient and Byzantine faults. Section 5.1 presents the distributed protocol while Sects. 5.2 and 5.3 prove respectively its TA strict stabilization and its TA strong stabilization. Note that we prove the optimality of containment areas of our protocol in Sect. 6.
Containment areas
We define now the containment areas performed by our protocol. First, the containment area for topology-aware strict stabilization is the following (see Theorem 2):
Intuitively, S B gathers the set of correct vertices that are closer or at equals distance (according to M) to a Byzantine vertex than the root. Then, we can define the containment area for topology-aware strong stabilization (see Theorem 3):
Intuitively, S * B gathers the set of correct vertices that are strictly closer (according to M) to a Byzantine vertex than the root. Note that we assume for the sake of clarity that V \ S * B induces a connected communication subgraph. If it is not the case, then S * B is extended to include all vertices belonging to connected communication subgraphs of V \ S * B that not include r . Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide some examples of containment areas S B and S * B with respect to maximizable metrics previously presented. 
Distributed Protocol
A self-stabilizing distributed protocol for the maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to any maximizable metric has been proposed by [26] . In this distributed protocol, any vertex try to maximize its level variable in the tree by choosing as its parent (prnt variable) the neighbor that provides the best metric value. Using this strategy, the arbitrary initial configuration may lead to the formation of cycles. The key idea of this distributed protocol is to use the dist variable (upper bounded by a given constant D) to detect and break cycles of vertices that has the same (incorrect) maximum metric. The choice of the constant D is obviously capital for the self-stabilization of the distributed protocol. Gouda and Schneider proved that their distributed protocol is self-stabilizing if D is an upper bound on the length of the longest path of the desired tree.
A natural way to provide a topology-aware stabilizing solution to the maximum metric spanning tree construction is then to adapt the idea of round robin choice over neighbors presented in [20] to the distributed protocol of [26] . It is possible to prove that this strategy is sufficient to perform the (S B , n − 1)-TA strict stabilization. Unfortunately, this strategy is not suitable for topology-aware strong stabilization.
Indeed, an execution of the distributed protocol of [26] may be subject to an infinite number of S * B -disruptions due to the following fact: a Byzantine vertex can independently lie about its level and its dist variable. For example, a Byzantine vertex can provide a level equals to mr and a dist arbitrarily large. In this way, it may lead a correct vertex of S B \ S * B to have a dist variable equals to D − 1 such that no other correct vertex can choose it as its parent (this rule is necessary to break cycle) but it cannot modify its state (this rule is only enabled when dist is equals to D). Then, this vertex may always prevent some of its neighbors to join a M-path connected to the root and hence allow another Byzantine vertex to perform an infinite number of disruptions.
In contrast, we want to provide a distributed protocol that is simultaneously (S B , n− 1)-TA strictly stabilizing and (t, S * B , n − 1)-TA strongly stabilizing for maximum metric spanning tree construction. To perform this goal, our distributed protocol needs a supplementary assumption on the assignement of the considered maximizable metric over the communication graph.
We assume that we always have |M(g)| ≥ 2 (the necessity of this assumption is explained below). Nevertheless, note that the contrary case (|M(g)| = 1) is possible if and only if the assigned maximizable metric is equivalent to N C. As the distributed protocol presented in [20] performs (t, 0, n − 1)-strong stabilization with a finite t for this metric, we can achieve the (t, S * B , n −1)-TA strong stabilization when |M(g)| = 1 (since this implies that S * B = ∅). In this way, this assumption does not weaken the possibility result.
We already said that the distributed protocol of [26] is not suitable for our purposes but our distributed protocol borrows fundamental strategy from it. Indeed, we use almost the same ideas with the following two exceptions: (i) we ensure a fair selection along the set of neighbors with a round-robin order for the prnt variable and (ii) we modify the management of the dist variable to avoid executions exhibiting an infinite number of S * B -disruptions. In order to contain the effect of Byzantine vertices on dist variables, each vertex that has a level different from the one of its parent in the tree sets its dist variable to 0. In this way, a Byzantine vertex modifying its dist variable can only affect correct vertices that have the same level. Consequently, in the case where |M(g)| ≥ 2, we are ensured that correct vertices of S B \ S * B cannot keep a dist variable equals or greater than D − 1 infinitely. Hence, a correct vertex of S B \ S * B cannot be disturbed infinitely often without joining a M-path connected to the root.
We can see that the assumption |M(g)| ≥ 2 is essential to perform the topologyaware strong stabilization. Indeed, in the case where |M(g)| = 1, Byzantine vertices can play exactly the scenario described above (in this case, our distributed protocol is equivalent to the one of [26] ).
The second modification we bring to the management of the dist variable follows. When a vertex has an inconsistent dist variable with its parent, we allow it only to increase its dist variable. If the vertex needs to decrease its dist variable (when it has a strictly greater distance than its parent), then the vertex must change its parent. This rule allows us to bound the maximal number of actions of any vertex between two modifications of its parent (a Byzantine vertex cannot lead a correct one to infinitely often increase and decrease its distance without modifying its pointer).
Our protocol, SSMMT (for Strictly/strongly Stabilizing Maximum Metric T ree), is formally described in Protocol 1.
Proof of Topology-Aware Strict Stabilization
This section is devoted to the proof of the (S B , n − 1)-TA strict stabilization of SSMMT under the distributed weakly fair daemon (see Theorem 2). This proof is an induction proof with respect to the maximal metric of each correct vertex but the main difficulty comes from the fact that several vertices along a path could have the same maximal metric with respect to the root (or to a Byzantine vertex).
We must first prove some lemmas. From now, we consider that M = (M, W, mr, met, ≺) is a maximizable metric assigned over our communication graph g = (V, E) by the weight function wf. First, we provide a useful property about M.
Lemma 1 For any vertex v ∈ V , we have: , u, q) . Then, the construction of q allows us to deduce that:
Protocol 1 SSMMT : (S B , n − 1)-TA strictly and (t, S * B , n − 1)-TA strongly stabilizing distributed protocol for spec MMT for vertex v.
Constants:
N v : set of neighbors of v (ordered in a round robin fashion) D: upper bound of the number of vertices in an elementary path Variables:
. . , D}: distance of v in the current tree Functions:
next v : for any subset A ⊆ N v , next v (A) returns the first element of A that is bigger than prnt v in a round-robin fashion and an arbitrary element of
Since we have met(max_met(g, u, q), w u,v ) max_met(g, v, q), we conclude that:
This contradicts the fact that q ∈ B ∪ {r } and shows us the result.
Given a configuration γ ∈ Γ and a metric value m ∈ M, let us define the following predicate:
Lemma 2 For any metric value m ∈ M, the predicate IM m is closed by actions of SSMMT .
Proof Let m be a metric value (m ∈ M). Let γ ∈ Γ be a configuration such that IM m (γ ) = true and γ ∈ Γ be a configuration such that (γ , γ ) is an action of SSMMT .
If the root vertex r is activated during action (γ , γ ) (respectively a Byzantine vertex b is activated during action (γ , γ )), then we have level r = mr (respectively level b mr) in γ by construction of (R r ) (respectively by definition of level b ). Hence, we have: If we apply Lemma 1 to met and to neighbor p, we obtain the following property:
Then,
As met(m, w v, p ) m, we can conclude that:
We can deduce that IM m (γ ) = true, that concludes the proof.
Given an assigned metric over a communication graph g, we can observe that the set of used metrics value M(g) is finite and that we can label elements of M(g) by m 0 = mr, m 1 , . . . , m k in a way such that ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, m i+1 ≺ m i .
For any m i ∈ M(g), we introduce the following set of notations:
Then, we define the following set of configurations : LC MMT = LC m k Lemma 3 For any m i ∈ M(g), the set LC m i is closed by actions of SSMMT .
Proof Let m i be a metric value from M(g) and γ be a configuration of LC m i . By construction, any vertex v ∈ V m i satisfies spec MMT (v) in γ .
In particular, the root vertex satisfies: prnt r = ⊥, level r = mr, and dist r = 0. By construction of SSMMT , r is not enabled and then never modifies its O-variables (since the guard of the rule of r does not involve the state of its neighbors).
In the same way, any vertex v ∈ V m i satisfies:
Assume that there exists a vertex v ∈ V m i that is activated during an action (γ , γ ) in an execution starting from γ (without loss of generality, assume that v is the first vertex of v ∈ V m i that is activated in this execution). Then, we know that v = r . This activation implies that a neighbor u / ∈ V m i (since v is the first vertex of V m i to be activated) of v modified its level variable to a metric value m ∈ M such that level v ≺ met(m, w u,v ) in γ (note that O-variables of v and of prnt v remain consistent since v is the first vertex to be activated in this execution).
Hence, we have Consequently, we obtain that:
This is contradictory with the result of Lemma 1.
In conclusion, no vertex v ∈ V m i is activated in any execution starting from γ and then always satisfies spec MMT (v) . Then, the closure of IM m i (established in Lemma 2) concludes the proof.
Lemma 4 Any configuration of LC
Proof This is a direct application of the Lemma 3 to LC MMT = LC m k .
Lemma 5 Starting from any configuration of Γ , any execution of SSMMT under the distributed weakly fair daemon reaches in a finite time a configuration of LC mr .
Proof Let γ be an arbitrary configuration. Then, it is obvious that IM mr (γ ) is satisfied. By closure of IM mr (proved in Lemma 2), we know that IM mr remains satisfied in any execution σ starting from γ .
If r does not satisfy spec MMT (r ) in γ , then r is continuously enabled. Since the daemon is weakly fair, r is activated in a finite time and then r satisfies spec MMT (r ) in a finite time. Denote by γ the first configuration where spec MMT (r ) holds. Note that r is never activated in any execution starting from γ .
The boundedness of M implies that P mr induces a connected subsystem. If P mr = {r }, then we proved that γ ∈ LC mr and we have the result.
Otherwise (P mr = {r }), observe that, for any configuration of an execution starting from γ , if all vertices of P mr are not enabled, then any vertex v of P mr satisfies spec MMT (v) . Assume now that there exists an execution σ starting from γ where some vertices of P mr are infinitely often activated. By construction, at least one of these vertices (note it v) has a neighbor u that is activated only a finite number of time in σ (recall that P mr induces a connected subsystem and that r is not activated in σ ). After u takes its last action of σ , we can observe that level u = mr and dist u < D − 1 (otherwise, u is activated in a finite time that contradicts its construction).
As v can execute consecutively (R 1 ) only a finite number of time (since the incrementation of dist v is bounded by D), we can deduce that v executes (R 2 ) or (R 3 ) infinitely often in σ . In both cases, u belongs to the set that is the parameter of function next v . By the fairness of this function, we can deduce that prnt v = u in a finite time in σ . Then, the construction of u implies that v is never enabled in the sequel of σ . This is contradictory with the construction of σ .
Consequently, any execution starting from γ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that all vertices of P mr are not enabled. We can deduce that this configuration belongs to LC mr , that ends the proof.
Lemma 6
For any m i ∈ M(g) and for any configuration γ ∈ LC m i , any execution of SSMMT starting from γ under the distributed weakly fair daemon reaches in a finite time a configuration such that:
Proof Let m i be an arbitrary metric value of M(g) and γ 0 be an arbitrary configuration of LC m i . Let σ = (γ 0 , γ 1 ) . . . be an execution starting from γ 0 .
Note that γ 0 satisfies IM m i by construction. Hence, we have ∀v ∈ I m i , level v m i . The closure of IM m i (proved in Lemma 2) ensures us that this property is satisfied in any configuration of σ .
If any vertex v ∈ I m i satisfies level v ≺ m i in γ 0 , then the result is obvious. Otherwise, we define the following variant function. For any configuration γ j of σ , we denote by A j the set of vertices v of I m i such that level v = m i in γ j . Then, we define f (γ j ) = min v∈A j {dist v }. We then prove the result by showing that there exists an
, then it takes a dist value greater or equals to f (γ j−1 ) + 1 by construction of SSMMT . We can deduce that any vertex that joins A j does not decrease f . Moreover, the construction of SSMMT implies that a vertex v such that v ∈ A j and v ∈ A j+1 cannot decrease its dist value in the action (γ j , γ j+1 ).
Then, consider for a given configuration γ j a vertex v ∈ A j such that dist v = f (γ j ) < D. We claim that v is enabled by SSMMT in γ j and that the execution of the enabled rule either increases strictly dist v or removes v from A j+1 . To prove this claim, we distinguish the following cases:
The fact that v ∈ I m i , the boundedness of M and the closure of IM m i (established in Lemma 2) imply that prnt v ∈ A j (and, hence that level prnt v = m i ). Then, by construction of f (γ j ), we know that dist prnt v ≥ f (γ j ) = dist v . Hence, we have dist v < dist prnt v + 1 in γ j . Then, v is enabled by (R 1 ) in γ j and dist v increases by at least 1 during the action (γ j , γ j+1 ) if this rule is executed.
, the claim is satisfied. In the contrary case (v belongs to A j+1 ), we know that level v = m i in γ j+1 . The boundedness of M and the closure of IM m i (established in Lemma 2) imply that level prnt v = m i in γ j+1 . We can conclude that dist v increases by at least 1 during the action (γ j , γ j+1 ) since the new parent of v has a distance greater than f (γ j ) by construction of A j+1 . Otherwise, we know that the rule (R 1 ) is enabled for v in γ j . If this rule is executed during the action (γ j , γ j+1 ), one of the two following sub cases appears.
Then, v does not belong to A j+1 by definition.
Remind that the closure of IM m i (established in Lemma 2) implies then that level prnt v = m i . By construction of f (γ j ), we have dist prnt v ≥ f (γ j ) in γ j . Then, we can see that dist v increases by at least 1 during the action (γ j , γ j+1 ).
In all cases, v is enabled (at least by (R 1 )) in γ j and the execution of the enabled rule either increases strictly dist v or removes v from A j+1 .
As I m i is finite and the daemon is weakly fair, we can deduce that f increases in a finite time in any execution starting from γ j . By repeating the argument at most D time, we can deduce that σ contains a configuration γ k such that f (γ k ) = D, that shows the result.
Lemma 7
For any m i ∈ M(g) and for any configuration γ ∈ LC m i such that ∀v ∈ For any configuration γ j of σ , let us denote A j = {v ∈ I m i |level v = m i }. By the closure of IM m i (that holds by definition in γ 0 ) established in Lemma 2, we obtain the result if there exists a configuration γ j of σ such that A j = ∅.
If there exist some vertices v ∈ I m i \ A 0 (and hence level v ≺ m i ) such that prnt v ∈ A 0 and met(level prnt v , w v,prnt v ) = m i in γ 0 , then we can observe that these vertices are continuously enabled by (R 1 ). As the daemon is weakly fair, v executes this rule in a finite time and then, level v = m i and dist v = D. In other words, v joins A for a given integer . We can conclude that there exists an integer k such that the following property ( P) holds: for any v ∈ I m i \ A 0 , either
Then, we prove that, for any integer j ≥ k, we have A j+1 ⊆ A j . For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists an integer j ≥ k and a vertex v ∈ I m i such that v ∈ A j+1 and v / ∈ A j . Without loss of generality, assume that j is the smallest integer that satisfies these properties. Let us study the following cases:
Note that the property ( P) still holds in γ j by the construction of j. Hence, we know that prnt v / ∈ A j in γ j . But in this case, we have:
That implies that v chooses a new parent that has a distance smaller than D − 1 in γ j . This implies that this new parent does not belongs to A j . Then, we have level prnt v ≺ m i . The boundedness of M implies that level v = met(level prnt v , w v,prnt v ) ≺ m i in γ j+1 that contradicts the fact that v ∈ A j+1 .
In the two cases, our claim is satisfied. In other words, there exists a point of the execution (namely γ k ) afterwards the set A cannot grow (this implies that, if a vertex leaves the set A, it is a definitive leaving).
Assume now that there exists an action (γ j , γ j+1 ) (with j ≥ k) such that a vertex v ∈ A j is activated. Observe that the closure of IM m i (established in Lemma 2) implies that v can not be activated by the rule (R 3 ). If v activates (R 1 ) during this action, then v modifies its level during this action (otherwise, we have a contradiction with the fact that level prnt v = m i ⇒ dist v = D). The closure of IM m i implies that v leaves the set A during this action. If v activates (R 2 ) during this action, then v chooses a new parent that has a distance smaller than D − 1 in γ j . This implies that this new parent does not belongs to A j . Then, we have level prnt v ≺ m i . The boundedness of M implies that level v ≺ m i in γ j+1 . In other words, if a vertex of A j is activated during the action (γ j , γ j+1 ), then it satisfies v / ∈ A j+1 . Finally, observe that the construction of SSMMT and the construction of the bound D ensure us that any vertex v ∈ I m i such that dist v = D is activated in a finite time. In conclusion, we obtain that there exists an integer j such that A j = ∅, that implies the result. Proof Let m i be a metric value of M(g) and γ be an arbitrary configuration of LC m i . We know by Lemma 8 that any execution starting from γ reaches in a finite time a configuration γ such that IM m i+1 holds. By closure of IM m i+1 and of LC m i (established respectively in Lemma 2 and 3), we know that any configuration of any execution starting from γ belongs to LC m i and satisfies IM m i+1 .
We know that V m i = ∅ since r ∈ V m i for any i ≥ 0. Remind that V m i+1 is connected by the boundedness of M. Then, we know that there exists at least one vertex p of P m i+1 that has a neighbor q in V m i such that max_met(g, p, r ) = met(max_met(g, q, r ), w p,q ). Moreover, Lemma 3 ensures us that any vertex of V m i is not activated in any execution starting from γ .
Observe that, for any configuration of any execution starting from γ , if any vertex of P m i+1 is not enabled, then all vertices v of P m i+1 satisfy spec MMT (v) . Assume now that there exists an execution σ starting from γ where some vertices of P m i+1 are infinitely often activated. By construction, at least one of these vertices (note it v) has a neighbor u such that max_met(g, v, r ) = met(max_met(g, u, r ), w v,u ) that takes only a finite number of actions in σ (recall the construction of p). After u takes its last action of σ , we can observe that level u = max_met(g, u, r ) and dist u < D − 1 (otherwise, u is activated in a finite time that contradicts its construction).
As v can execute consecutively (R 1 ) only a finite number of time (since the incrementation of dist v is bounded by D), we can deduce that v executes (R 2 ) or (R 3 ) infinitely often. In both cases, u belongs to the set that is the parameter of function next v (remind that IM m i+1 is satisfied and that u has the better possible metric among v's neighbors). By the construction of this function, we can deduce that prnt v = u in a finite time in σ . Then, the construction of u implies that v is never enabled in the sequel of σ . This is contradictory with the construction of σ .
Consequently, any execution starting from γ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that all vertices of P m i+1 are not enabled. We can deduce that this configuration belongs to LC m i+1 , that ends the proof.
Lemma 10
Starting from any configuration, any execution of SSMMT under the distributed weakly fair daemon reaches a configuration of LC MMT in a finite time.
Proof Let γ be an arbitrary configuration. We know by Lemma 5 that any execution starting from γ reaches in a finite time a configuration of LC mr = LC m 0 . Then, we can apply at most k time the result of Lemma 9 to obtain that any execution starting from γ reaches in a finite time a configuration of LC m k = LC MMT , that proves the result.
Theorem 2 SSMMT is a (S B , n − 1)-TA strictly stabilizing distributed protocol for spec MMT under the distributed weakly fair daemon.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4 and 10.
Proof of Topology-Aware Strong Stabilization
In this section, we prove the (t, S * B , n −1)-TA strong stabilization of SSMMT under the distributed k-bounded strongly fair daemon. Note that k may be any arbitrary natural number. Nevertheless, the actual value of k influences the maximal number of disruptions t of SSMMT .
The key idea is to focus on vertices of S B \ S * B after the convergence of SSMMT on S B and to prove the two following properties: any such vertex executes a bounded number of steps in any execution and cannot remain unactivated if it does not satisfy spec MMT .
Let us denote E B = S B \ S * B (i.e. E B is the set of vertices v such that max_met(g, v, r ) = max b∈B {max_met(g, v, b)}). Intuitively, E B gathers vertices that are at equal distance (with respect to M) from the root and from the nearest Byzantine vertex. Note that the communication subgraph g(E B ) induced by E B may have several connected components. In the following, we use the following notations: Proof Let γ be a configuration of LC MMT and σ be an execution starting from γ . Let p be a vertex of E i B (i ∈ {0, . . . , }) such that there exists a neighbor q that satisfies q ∈ V \ S B and max_met(g, p, r ) = met(max_met(g, q, r ), w p,q ) (such a vertex exists by construction of E i B ). We are going to prove by induction on d the following property:
This implies that v = p. Then, by construction, there exists a neighbor q that satisfies q ∈ V \ S B and max_met(g, p, r ) = met (max_met(g, q, r ), w p,q ). As γ ∈ LC MMT , Lemma 4 ensures us that level q = max_met(g, q, r ) and dist q < D −1 in any configuration of σ . Then, the boundedness of M implies that q belongs to the set that is parameter to the function next v at any execution of rules (R 2 ) or (R 3 ) by p. Consequently, p executes at most deg(g) time rules (R 2 ) and (R 3 ) in σ before choosing q as its parent. Moreover, note that p can execute rule (R 1 ) at most D time between two consecutive executions of rules (R 2 ) and (R 3 ) (because (R 1 ) only increases dist p that is bounded by D). Consequently, p executes at most deg(g) × D actions before choosing q as its parent. By Lemma 4, we know that q takes no action in σ . Once p chooses q as its parent, its state is consistent with the one of q (by construction of rules (R 2 ) and (R 3 )). Hence, p is never enabled after choosing q as its parent. Consequently, we obtain that p takes at most deg(g) × D actions in σ , that proves ( P 0 ). Induction: d > 0 and ( P d−1 ) is true.
Let v be a vertex of E i B such that dist(g(E i B ), p, v) = d. By construction, there exists a neighbor u of v that belongs to E i B such that dist(g(E i B ), p, u) = d − 1. By ( P d−1 ), we know that u takes at most Π(k, d − 1) × deg(g) × D actions in σ . The k-boundedness of the daemon allows us to conclude that v takes at most k ×Π(k, d −1)×deg(g)× D actions before the last action of u. Then, a similar reasoning to the one of the initialization part allows us to say that v takes at most deg(g) × D actions after the last action of u (note that the fact that |M(g)| ≥ 2, the construction of D and the management of dist variables imply that dist u < D −1 after the last action of u). In con-
As diam(g(E B )) is the maximal diameter of connected components of the communication subgraph induced by E B , then we know that dist(g (E 
We can deduce that any vertex of E B takes at most Π(k, diam(g(E B ))) × deg(g) × D actions in σ , that implies the result.
Lemma 12
If γ is a configuration of LC MMT and v is a vertex such that v ∈ E B , then for any execution σ starting from γ either 1. there exists a configuration γ of σ such that spec MMT (v) is always satisfied after γ ; or 2. v is activated in σ .
Proof Let γ be a configuration of LC MMT and v be a vertex such that v ∈ E B . By contradiction, assume that there exists an execution σ starting from γ such that (i) spec MMT (v) is infinitely often false in σ and (ii) v is never activated in σ .
For any configuration γ * , let us denote by
the maximal sequence of vertices following pointers prnt (maximal means here that either prnt p v = ⊥ or p v is the first vertex such that there p v = v i for some i ∈ {0, . . . , k}).
Let us study the following cases:
Since γ ∈ LC MMT , prnt v satisfies spec MMT (prnt v ) in γ and in any execution starting from γ (by Lemma 4) . Hence, prnt v is never activated in σ . If v does not satisfy spec MMT 
Then, v is continuously enabled in σ and we have a contradiction between assumption (ii) and the strong fairness of the daemon. This implies that v satisfies spec MMT (v) in γ . The fact that prnt v is never activated in γ and that the state of v is consistent with the one of prnt v ensures us that v is never enabled in any execution starting from γ . Hence, spec MMT (v) remains true in any execution starting from γ . This contradicts the assumption (i) on σ . Case 2 prnt v / ∈ V \ S B in γ . By the assumption (i) on σ , we can deduce that there exists infinitely many configurations γ such that a vertex of P v (γ ) is enabled (since spec MMT (v) is false only when the state of a vertex of P v (γ ) is not consistent with the one of its parent that made it enabled). By construction, the length of P v (γ ) is finite for any configuration γ and there exists only a finite number of vertices in the communication graph. Consequently, there exists at least one vertex that is infinitely often enabled in σ . Since the daemon is strongly fair, we can conclude that there exists at least one vertex that is infinitely often activated in σ . Let A σ be the set of vertices that are infinitely often activated in σ . Note that v / ∈ A σ by assumption (ii) on σ . Let σ be the suffix of σ starting from γ that contains only activations of vertices of A σ . Let p be the first vertex of P v (γ ) that belongs to A σ ( p exists since at least one vertex of P v is enabled when spec MMT (v) is false). By construction, the prefix of P v (γ ) from v to p in any configuration γ of σ remains the same as the one of P v (γ ). Let p be the vertex such that prnt p = p in σ ( p exists since v = p implies that the prefix of P v (γ ) from v to p counts at least two vertices). As p is infinitely often activated and as any activation of p modifies the value of level p or of dist p (at least one of these two variables takes at least two different values in σ ), we can deduce that p is infinitely often enabled in σ (since the value of level p is constant by construction of σ and p). Since the daemon is strongly fair, p is activated in a finite time in σ , that contradicts the construction of p.
In the two cases, we obtain a contradiction with the construction of σ , that proves the result.
Let LC * MMT be the following set of configurations:
Note that, as S * B ⊆ S B , we can deduce that LC * MMT ⊆ LC MMT . Hence, properties of Lemmas 11 and 12 also apply to configurations of LC * MMT .
Lemma 13 Any configuration of LC
Proof Let γ be a configuration of LC * MMT . As S * B ⊆ S B , we know by Lemma 4 that any vertex v of V \ S B satisfies spec MMT (v) and takes no action in any execution starting from γ .
Let v be a vertex of E B . By Lemmas 11 and 12, we know that v takes at most Π(k, diam(g(E B )) × deg(g) × D actions in any execution starting from γ . Moreover, we know that v satisfies spec MMT (v) after its last action (otherwise, we obtain a contradiction between the two lemmas). Hence, any vertex of E B takes at most Π(k, diam(g(E B )) × deg(g) × D actions and then, there are at most n × Π(k, diam(g(E B )) × deg(g) × D S * B -TA disruptions in any execution starting from γ (since |E B | ≤ n).
By definition of a TA time contained configuration, we obtain the result.
Lemma 14
Starting from any configuration, any execution of SSMMT under the distributed k-bounded strongly fair daemon reaches a configuration of LC * MMT in a finite time.
Proof Let γ be an arbitrary configuration. We know by Lemma 10 that any execution starting from γ reaches in a finite time a configuration γ of LC MMT .
Let v be a vertex of E B . By Lemmas 11 and 12, we know that v takes at most Π(k, diam(g(E B )) × deg(g) × D actions in any execution starting from γ . Moreover, we know that v satisfies spec MMT (v) after its last action (otherwise, we obtain a contradiction between the two lemmas). This implies that any execution starting from γ reaches a configuration γ such that any vertex v of E B satisfies spec MMT (v) . It is easy to see that γ ∈ LC * MMT , that ends the proof.
, S * B , n − 1)-TA strongly stabilizing distributed protocol for spec MMT under the distributed k-bounded strongly fair daemon.
Optimality of Containment Areas
This section presents two impossibility results that prove the optimality of containment areas provided by the distributed protocol of the previous section. Indeed, Theorem 4 states that there exists no topology-aware strictly stabilizing distributed protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction for any containment area strictly included in S B while Theorem 5 proves that there exists no topology-aware strongly stabilizing distributed protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction for any containment area strictly included in S * B . These proofs are based on the construction of a communication graph (depending of the characteristic of the considered maximizable metric) and of a Byzantine behavior that allows us to invalidate the topology-aware strict (respectively strong) stabilization of any distributed protocol exhibiting better containment areas than SSMMT . Proof Let M = (M, W, mr, met, ≺) be a maximizable metric and π be a (A B , 1)-TA strictly stabilizing distributed protocol for spec M MT with respect to M where A B S B . We must distinguish the following cases:
Topology-Aware Strict Stabilization
Denote by m the metric value such that M = {m}. For any communication graph and for any vertex v = r , we have: Fig. 4 , other variables may have arbitrary values). Note that γ 0 0 is A B -legitimate for spec MMT (whatever A B is). Assume now that b behaves as a correct vertex with respect to π . Then, by convergence of π in a fault-free system starting from γ 0 0 that is not ∅-legitimate (remember that a topology-aware strictly stabilizing distributed protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing distributed protocol), we can deduce that π reaches in a finite time a configuration γ 0 1 (see Fig. 4 ), where: prnt r = ⊥, prnt u = r, prnt v = u, prnt b = v, level r = level u = level v = level b = m, dist r = 0, dist u = 1, dist v = 2 and dist b = 3. Note that vertices u and v modify their O-variables in this execution. This contradicts the (A B , 1)-TA strict stabilization of π (whatever A B is). Case 2 |M| ≥ 2.
By definition of a bounded metric and from the utility condition, we can deduce that there exist m ∈ M and w ∈ W such that m = met(mr, w) ≺ mr. Then, we must distinguish the following cases: Fig. 4 , other variables may have arbitrary values). Note that γ 1 0 is A B -legitimate for spec MMT (whatever A B is). Assume now that b behaves as a correct vertex with respect to π . Then, by convergence of π in a fault-free system starting from γ 1 0 that is not ∅legitimate (remember that a topology-aware strictly stabilizing distributed protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing distributed protocol), we can deduce that π reaches in a finite time a configuration γ 1 1 (see Fig. 4 ), where: Fig. 4 , other variables may have arbitrary values). Note that γ 2 0 is A B -legitimate for spec MMT (whatever A B is) . Assume now that b behaves as a correct vertex with respect to π . Then, by convergence of π in a fault-free system starting from γ 2 0 that is not ∅legitimate (remember that a topology-aware strictly stabilizing distributed protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing distributed protocol), we can deduce that π reaches in a finite time a configuration γ 2 1 (see Fig. 4 ), where:
Note that vertices v and v modify their O-variables in this execution. This contradicts the (A B , 1)-TA strict stabilization of π (whatever A B is). By definition of a bounded metric and from the utility condition, we can deduce that there exist m ∈ M and w ∈ W such that m = met(mr, w) ≺ mr. Then, we must distinguish the following cases: Case 2.1 m is a fixed point of M.
Let g be a communication graph such that any edge incident to the root or a Byzantine vertex has a weight equals to w. Then, we can deduce that we have: infinite number of A * B -TA disruptions (whatever A * B is), which contradicts the (t, A * B , 1)-TA strong stabilization property of π .
Conclusion
Summary This paper focused on maximum metric spanning tree construction in distributed systems simultaneously subject to transient and Byzantine faults. Spanning tree construction is a fundamental task in distributed systems since it permits to construct a virtual communication structure that allows every vertex to communicate using a minimal number of edges of the original communication graph. According to desired characteristics of the spanning tree (minimum weight, shortest path to the root, minimal degree,. . .), there exist numerous self-stabilizing distributed protocols. To our knowledge, our work is the first to consider spanning tree construction in presence of both transient and Byzantine faults. As this problem is global (whatever the considered spanning tree properties are), there exists no strictly-stabilizing solution for any (finite) containment radius by the generic impossibility result of Nesterenko and Arora [33] . Therefore, our main contribution is to propose three new schemes of Byzantine containment in self-stabilization in order to by-pass this impossibility result.
First, we proposed strong stabilization, where the constraint about the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. there may exist vertices outside the containment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to Byzantine actions. However, the impact of Byzantine triggered-actions is limited in times: the set of Byzantine vertices may only impact vertices outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine vertices execute an infinite number of actions. This new scheme of Byzantine containment in self-stabilization generalizes strict stabilization as a strictly stabilizing distributed protocol is a strongly stabilizing one with a maximal number of disruptions equal to 0. Although this new scheme is sufficient to by-pass some impossibility results [20] , it is still too strong for some problems as there remain impossibility results in the context of strong stabilization. We proposed a new notion for Byzantine containment in self-stabilization: the topology-aware stabilization. Here, the requirement about the containment radius is relaxed to a containment area, i.e. the set of vertices that may be disturbed by Byzantine ones is not reduced to the union of c-neighborhood of Byzantine vertices but is defined as a function of the communication graph and Byzantine vertices locations. Note that this relaxation may be applied either to strict or to strong stabilization.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our notions of topology-aware stabilization, we focused on a large class of spanning tree constructions: the maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to any maximizable metric. Intuitively, a metric is a scheme to compute a distance along any path of the communication graph. A metric is maximizable if there always exists a spanning tree that maximizes the metric of each vertex of any communication graph with respect to a distinguished vertex called the root. For example, the shortest path or the flow metric are maximizable. In contrast, there exists no maximizable metric to model the minimum weight or the minimum degree spanning tree construction. In this paper, we characterize the possibility range of each of these fault tolerance schemes. All results are summarized in Table 1 . Note that these results subsume those presented in related previous works [18, 20] .
Open questions
The results presented in this paper show that our new notions of topology-aware stabilization are convenient to circumvent impossibility results related to strict stabilization. Nevertheless, interesting open questions remain.
Daemon requirements for the correctness of our distributed protocols were not discussed here. It would be interesting to prove their necessity or to provide distributed protocols operating with weaker daemon, if possible. In this case, is it possible to keep the optimality of containment areas? Another way to complement results of this paper is to study the relationship between the containment areas and the maximal number of disruptions. Intuitively, if constraints on containment area are weakened, the maximal number of disruptions may decrease. While maximizable metrics are a large class of metrics, there exist numerous other metrics to construct spanning tree. We think that the study of Byzantine containment properties of these metrics is worth studying.
Note that the distributed protocols provided in this paper that achieve topologyaware strong stabilization require a strongly fair daemon. We conjecture that the strong fairness property is necessary to perform (topology-aware) strong stabilization. Formally proving this conjecture is an interesting open question.
Finally, we presented definitions for strong stabilization and topology-aware stabilization for static problems, i.e. problems that require the system to find static solutions, such as the maximum metric spanning tree construction. An interesting path for future research may be to provide strong or topology-aware stabilizing distributed protocols for other static problems or to extend our definitions to dynamic problems such as token circulation.
